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Introduction 
The post-industrial city is a term used in academia to describe cities with a certain 
occupational composition, geographic organization and relationship to other cities.  The post-
industrial city is distinctive in terms of its division of labor, the spatial distribution of people 
across its landscape and an increasing emphasis on revitalization projects, particularly in the 
central business district.  This type of city stands in stark contrast to urban centers built up during 
the industrial revolution, where city centers were the primary location of business, retail and 
industry.  Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh and Buffalo are examples of compact and densely 
populated cities that grew rapidly during this time in American history because of their 
importance in manufacturing.  Such robust growth and economic prosperity became associated 
with industrial towns and cities.  But following the Great Depression and World War II, the 
economic sectors on which their growth was based went into relative decline.  Cities which built 
their fortunes around steel mills and factories now saw dramatic changes in their economies as 
businesses began to close and people left for the surrounding suburbs, beginning in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. This was initially facilitated by trolley cars originating in the city center 
and then moving out into higher class neighborhoods. Automobile use and the construction of 
superhighways, capable of transporting people to and from the city and all points in between led 
to rapid suburbanization in the 20th century.   Such decline was sometimes accompanied by 
growth of a more post-industrial nature creating a new post-industrial city: an urban center which 
was well connected with other population centers, diverse in its labor force but primarily 
composed of people in the tertiary and quaternary sectors of the economy.  As one might 
imagine, cities in transition suffer from inherent conflict, spawned to some degree by inherent 
differences of opinion within the local population, especially between public and private 
interests.  The purpose of this research is to examine the inherent conflict surrounding the 
creation and formation of the post-industrial city and put it in perspective.  While there is a 
considerable amount of literature on the development of the post-industrial city, little has been 
said about the tensions in a city where knowledge and innovation are the main drivers of 
economic growth and prosperity. 
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Contextualizing the Post-Industrial City 
The Post-Industrial Society 
Just like cities, mankind has undergone many transformations.  For the better part of their 
existence, human beings lived off the land as hunter gatherers and then as farmers, engaging in 
subsistence farming practices in order to make a living. Over time, the development of what are 
considered ancient technologies today provided people with more efficient means of farming and 
thus improved their quality of life.  Anything that helped reduce labor-intensive work on the 
farm was seen as progress.  Up until the late 1880s, agriculture was an essential part of life, both 
in the United States and in Europe. However, this too began to change with the onset of the 
industrial revolution and agricultural mechanization.  By 1920, agricultural employment had 
been surpassed by manufacturing industry (Clark 1985: 5).  But this phase of industrial growth 
and development did not last nearly as long as its predecessor, quickly giving way to what some 
consider to be the service economy or the information age.  But it was not until the 1950s and 
1960s that people began to study this transformation in society, conceptualize it and speculate 
about its future.  While this idea of the post-industrial society is no longer the most discussed 
issue in academic circles, the American sociologist David Bell was quite successful in spawning 
thought-provoking conversations on the issues and matters relating to it, including that of the 
post-industrial city. 
The post-industrial society referred to a change from an industrial-based economy, 
relying on mass production, to one that is more focused on forms of industry that are knowledge-
intensive and often defined as part of the service sector.  Knowledge-intensive forms of industry 
include health care, higher education, design intensive forms of product, consultancy services, 
research and development.  Supporting services in this new economy included such things as 
banking, real estate, accounting, law and transportation.  In other words, the post-industrial 
society sees a shift in occupational composition from being predominately made up of blue-
collar workers to being dominated by white-collar workers.  Such shifts are observed in Table 1. 
 Up until the late 1940s, people engaged in the mass-production of manufactured goods 
retained a slim majority in the labor force.  For the most part, people in this line of work required 
very little education and simply needed training in order to carry out a specific task.   Henry Ford 
had been a pioneer in developing this mode of production in order to produce hundreds of his 
automobiles and his model spread to other industries.  For quite a while this method of producing 
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goods met public demand, but after 1950 this too started to decline.  As Table 1 clearly shows, 
the service sector surpassed the manufacturing industry in 1950 and over the next few years saw 
its presence in the economy grow.  With it came an expansion in different types of employment, 
requiring young people to further their education.  For the first time access to better job 
opportunities depended upon the amount of education a person received, and not an individuals 
capacity to perform repetitive tasks, requiring brute strength, high endurance and quite repetitive 
forms of thought. 
 
 
1950                
(millions of people) 
1950                
(% of employment) 
1980                  
(millions of people) 
1980                
(% of employment) 
     
Goods-producing total 26.5 49 31.8 33 
  Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6.9 13 3.4 3 
  Mining 0.9 2 0.9 1 
  Construction 3.4 6 6 6 
  Manufacturing 15.3 28 21.5 23 
     
Service-producing total 27.8 51 64.9 66 
  Transportation and utilities 2.9 5 6.3 7 
  Trade (wholesale and retail) 10.5 19 19.7 20 
  Finance, insurance and real estate 1.9 3 5.8 6 
  Personal, professional, and business services 10.1 20 27.9 28 
  Public Administration 2.4 4 5.2 5 
     
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1954, Table 2401, and 1981. Table 658.   
Taken from David Clark: Post Industrial America    
 
What is even more remarkable is to observe agriculture and related forms of occupation virtually 
vanish. Between 1950 and 1980, the fraction of the labor force engaged in these occupations 
declined by 10 percent, the most significant drop in employment in any sector of the economy. 
Today (Table 2), agriculture accounts for a mere 1.6 percent of the total labor force. 
 Overall, Tables 1 and 2 present a situation where white-collar workers are becoming the 
dominant occupational stratum in society.  While this transformation in the division of labor has 
occurred over a long period of time, its impact on society has been profound, both in its social 
and spatial organization.  And it is interesting to see that since 1950, government has also 
Table 1: Employment by Industry 1950 and 1980 
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expanded, and accounted for nearly 5 percent of the total work force in 2004. Later within the 
context of this paper, the role of government will be further examined, because it has played a 
crucial part in constructing the post-industrial society and city. 
Since Bells work on 
The Coming of the Post-
Industrial Society, many 
people have written on 
this subject.  In each 
presentation of it, human 
development has been 
characterized by three 
stages, each given its 
character by the branch 
of labor dominant at that 
time: agriculture, 
industry and services.  In 
the agricultural-based 
society, people survived 
on subsistence farming, 
a method of production 
that preempted the need 
for the exchange of 
goods in society.  Thus 
in agrarian society, the 
division of labor was simple and not complex. The industrial revolution was indeed 
revolutionary, because it diversified the labor force.  It allowed people to mass-produce goods on 
a scale not previously seen in human history due to significant technological breakthroughs in 
society.  As a result, industrialized countries increased their wealth, raising the standard of living 
for a majority of their citizens.   
 During this transition, agricultural productivity continued to increase, but with less 
people in the work force.  After the Great Depression and World War II, the United States 
 
2004                
(thousands of people) 
2004              
(% of people) 
    
Agriculture and related industries 2,232 1.6 
Mining 539 0.4 
Construction 10,768 7.7 
Manufacturing 16,484 11.8 
Wholesale trade 4,600 3.3 
Retail trade 16,269 11.7 
   
Transportation and utilities 7,013 5 
Information 3,463 2.5 
  Telecommunications 1,273 0.9 
Financial activities 9,969 7.2 
Professional and business services 14,108 10.1 
  Professional and technical services 8,386 6 
  Management, administrative, waste services  5,722 4.1 
   
Education and health services 28,719 20.6 
  Education services 12,058 8.7 
  Health care and social assistance 16,661 12 
Leisure and hospitality 11,820 8.5 
  Arts, entertainment and recreation 2,690 1.9 
  Accommodation and food services 9,131 6.6 
Other services 6,903 5 
Government workers 6,365 4.6 
   
Source:  Statistical Abstract of the United States 2004, Table 608.  
Total Work Force 139,252,000   
To get percentage, round to nearest tenth.   
Table 2: Employment by Industry 2004 
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economy again began to shift, this time focusing on the service sector and knowledge-intensive 
forms of industry.  Different growth sectors during this period included engineering, medical 
science, pharmaceuticals, education and later, telecommunications.  At each stage of 
development changes in society impacted the make-up and layout of the urban landscape.  In The 
Coming of Post-Industrial City, Bell argued that society is centered about an axis which 
influences decision making processes.  These axial or stages of development change from time to 
time and thus cause society to react and adjust, challenging current thought processes and 
ultimately altering the division of labor (Bell 1973: 117).  The post-industrial city reflects such 
shifts in the attitudes, beliefs and means of production that society has come to know and use to 
its advantage (Atkinson 2004: 27). 
 
The Post-Industrial City 
 From agriculture to an industrial society, and from an industrial to a post-industrial 
society, each shift has been accompanied by changes in geography.  With the development of an 
industrial society, the big geographic change was the concentration of people and industry in 
urban areas.  This was based in part on migration from rural areas since agriculture no longer 
needed such a substantial labor force due to mechanization.  More recently alongside the change 
from industrial to a post-industrial society, people claim to see a post-industrial city emerging.  
According to the literature, this is a city in which the central business district is characterized by 
banking, commerce, entertainment and other office and service activities.  The downtown of 
many cities is also becoming the cultural center of the larger metropolitan area, with theatrical 
performances and festivals taking place.  Cities are deliberately taking steps to make them more 
presentable in order to attract conferences, investment and other tourist activities.  Industry on 
the other hand, has all but disappeared from the center of the post-industrial city and relocated to 
smaller towns and suburban communities outside the city limits.  In their wake, their old physical 
shells are either being condemned or redeveloped into luxury apartments or entertainment and 
retail venues. 
 In addition to redefining the central city, the post-industrial city is also a conglomerate of 
professionals and non-professionals, both of which are engaged in service sector-related 
industries. This is much different from cities of the industrial era, because their economies were 
centered on one form of industry.  Todays post-industrial city is characterized as such because 
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its division of labor is diverse, yet more oriented toward the innovative, knowledge intensive and 
knowledge producing industries that continue to spur growth.  In this way, such cities offer a 
variety of employment opportunities, making them more adept and capable of dealing with 
changes in the economy.  This flexibility is the result of new and improved technologies 
(Cortada 2002: 62).  Conversely, Fainstein et al in Restructuring the City demonstrate how 
change can be a slow and challenging process.  In their book are accounts of several 
industrialized cities, such as Detroit and New Orleans, where shifts in the economy were not 
adequately addressed and now pose a significant hurdle for those communities to overcome.   
 Stanback and Noyelle in Cities in Transition have theorized three major causes for 
significant changes in the city; the increasing size of markets, the rise of corporate headquarters 
and the growth of government and non-profit institutions (Stanback & Noyelle 1982: 10).  With 
continued advancements in technology, cities and their business clienteles have access to larger 
markets outside of their immediate vicinity.  This creates opportunities for growth and 
specialization in the production of certain goods and services.  Businesses and corporations find 
access to a variety of goods and services profitable.  If cities have access to larger markets, their 
prospects for business investment and growth increase.  The rise of corporate headquarters in 
cities has also transformed the landscape by creating new services and industries.  This makes 
cities more attractive to investors and perpetuates growth.  Growth in government and non-profit 
institutions is the result of and need for research and development.  This has been financially 
supported at all levels of government, particularly at the local level.  The changes discussed by 
Stanback and Noyelle have diversified the labor force in many communities in order to meet the 
demands of a post-industrial society.   
  The post-industrial city is a dynamic place, where employment opportunities are diverse 
and where people (for the most part) are socially, economically and ethnically segregated.  This 
is much different from the industrial city, where the work force was primarily engaged in 
manufacturing and labor intensive activities.  It was also densely populated and consolidated; 
people lived close to their place of employment.  Although the cause for such dramatic changes 
in urban centers will be addressed, the focus of this research is to examine the conflicts that have 
occurred in creating the post-industrial city.  Understanding that the post-industrial city is a 
reflection and direct consequence of restructuring society will give these contentious issues more 
clarity and meaning. 
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1.  Establishing Pre-Conditions: The Central City Problem  
Before the post-industrial city was ever discussed, cities and towns alike were engaged in 
industrial activities.  Industrial activities usually required a significant amount of land and a large 
number of people in order to perform the labor-intensive tasks.  People living in rural 
communities outside the cities, as well as migrants from Europe, saw the industrialized city as a 
place of refuge; a way to escape the harsh realities of living life on the farm.  In doing so, 
families met the needs of an industrializing society by providing the labor force it needed to 
function.  Due to limits on daily mobility at the time, families were forced to live in close 
proximity to their place of employment.  In essence there was a unique relationship between 
society, the city and its industrial base.  For a brief time these three modes of organization 
worked in tandem with one another, but this began to disintegrate early in the 20th century. 
 Over the years cities became densely populated, as more and more people relocated to the 
inner cities.   This inherently put stress on local governments and other associated authorities to 
address issues such as air pollution, overcrowding and other services performed by the city as a 
result of urbanization.  Conditions in the city deteriorated rapidly, causing it to no longer be an 
optimal place to work or raise children.  Thus, those who could afford to move beyond the city 
limits did so into smaller suburban communities.  Although people began moving away in the 
early 1900s, the automobile and the construction of an intricate network of highways financed by 
state and federal governments, significantly enhanced this mass exodus from the city, 
particularly after World War II (Mills 1969: 12).  This movement of people, industry and 
business, as one could imagine, had a direct impact on cities across the United States and in other 
capitalist countries around the world.  Cities, which had been reliant on tax revenue generated 
from residential, commercial and industrial property values, found it increasingly more difficult 
to function properly and meet the needs of their inhabitants with less revenue.  The substantial 
tax base that had once been present in the central city, now resided in the periphery where new 
homes were being constructed and where other commercial and industrial activities were taking 
place.  In essence, the city had imploded, causing land values in and around the central city to 
decrease dramatically.  By 1930 this decline in property values began to have a profound impact 
on the social and economic well being of the central city, in terms of its daily function and 
appearance.  
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This period of transition from the industrial to the post-industrial city was characterized, 
therefore, by what was called the central city problem.  The central city problem was one of 
depreciating land values in the urban center, lack of investments downtown and a slow degrading 
of communities, some of which used to be inhabited by the metropolitan areas most well do to 
families.  Although the movement of affluent people to the suburbs was initially the cause of 
such decline, the magnitude by which events unfolded in cities cannot be explained by this 
occurrence alone.  Rather, numerous factors led to the decline of the inner cities, including issues 
involving transportation, job opportunities or the lack thereof, poverty and something called 
image-control (Library of Congress 1973: 26).  However, those who had vested interests in the 
central city did not sit idly by and watch their investments deteriorate.   
Citizen action groups and other activists demanded better housing for the poor.  While 
businesses and industries were also concerned about degrading, each was motivated to take 
action for different reasons.  The poor resided in housing stock that was seen as less than 
acceptable and needed to be demolished and replaced. Thus two campaigns emerged, united in 
their effort to rid the city of blighted communities, but they were at odds with one another over 
how the city should be subsequently rebuilt.  Instead of coming together and presenting a unified 
vision for the city, each campaign made a concerted effort to influence local, state and federal 
officials and agencies as it pertained to urban renewal, with their own particular definitions of 
what urban renewal would amount to (Weiss 1980: 55).  In the end, urban renewal was carried 
out according to the image and vision businesses had set forth. This forced people of color and 
those who had very little monetarily to watch their neighborhoods be fragmented or demolished 
by government authorities.  Initially urban renewal projects were supposedly designed to 
improve conditions the poor found themselves in, by providing them with improved housing. But 
beginning in the early 1950s and over time, it became apparent that these policies were being 
hijacked by private investors in order to mitigate depreciating property values in the central city 
and to spark economic growth downtown. 
 
2.  Symptoms of Urban Decline and Suburbanization 
The industrial revolution invariably altered the way people did business, changed our 
perception of time and space and ultimately restructured the heart of many cities around the 
country.  Until the 1930s, the city served as the sole center for work, family and entertainment.  
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Downtowns were not only a source of employment, but also the place where people did their 
shopping, dined out and watched plays at the local theater.  In this manner, the city functioned 
and met the needs of all its citizens.  Slowly, however, the city began to fall into disarray; streets 
became overcrowded and living conditions within the city deteriorated.   
Table 3: Density Functions for Population 
Cities  1910 1920 1930 1940 1948 1954 1958 1963 
          
Baltimore y .97 .75 .64 .60 .48 .40 .36 .33 
 D 111,230 79,681 67,630 65,542 51,159 42,693 37,481 34,541 
 
Denver y .87 .87 .83 .76 .59 .45 .38 .33 
 D 28,291 34,870 36,265 35,334 27,779 22,884 19,678 18,008 
 
Milwaukee y .88 .81 .56 .51 .47 .37 .32 .27 
 D 108,510 114,200 74,209 65,434 58,318 44,262 37,823 31,123 
 
Philadelphia y .45 .43 .37 .36 .31 .27 .25 .23 
 D 63,566 70,839 62,034 59,789 53,264 45,714 41,868 38,268 
 
Rochester y 1.44  1.37 .96 .88 .73 .55 .47 .40 
 D 82,015 95,878 58,464 50,775 39,682 28,194 24,033 20,537 
 
Toledo y 1.13 1.43 1.01 .93 .83 .72 .67 .61 
 D 41,407 85,828 56,260 47,031 41,123 34,661 31,768 28,151 
Source: Edwin Mills: Urban Density Functions, 1969 
 
  
With new forms of technology and means of doing business, many people inevitably 
improved their economic positions.  Some benefited from the rise of industry so much, that they 
were able to leave the city and settle in smaller communities away from town.  As to whether 
economic mobility, accompanied by innovations in transportation, was the sole source of this 
decline is questionable.  But it is reasonable to believe that the poor state of affairs cities found 
themselves in, in conjunction with upward mobility, prompted people to leave.   Signs of decline 
were prevalent in blighted communities where land values had depreciated considerably.  Entire 
communities were being abandoned, leaving the poor to come in from behind and settle in what 
had been affluent neighborhoods.  But in order to fully understand the state of cities at this time, 
one need not look further than research conducted by Edwin Mills. 
 In his article on urban population density functions (1969), Mills examines this decline in 
urban centers through density functions relating population, manufacturing employment and 
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retail employment densities respectively to distance from city centers.  He believed that 
population densities are the clearest indicator of growth or decline in the central city  
 (Mills 1969: 5, Clark 1985: 
71).  In Tables 3, 4 and 5, y 
represents the gradient 
relating density to distance 
and D displays the density 
of that particular sector in 
the central city.   
Table 3 concerns six 
US cities and the changing 
rate at which population 
densities decline with 
distance; this is a measure 
of suburbanization. A 
decline in the value of y 
indicates increasing 
suburban growth relative to growth in the central city.  In the case of Rochester, New York, the 
high y value for population density at the turn of the century indicates a rather limited degree of 
suburbanization.  But as with the other cases in the table, these y values decline over time, 
indicating increasing suburbanization relative to growth in the central city  Other cities in this 
study also experienced a relative loss of people, but not at near the rate as Rochester or Toledo.  
Thus, decline in Philadelphia was more gradual and at not at such a high rate.     Although the 
rate of decline in each city is interesting, the overall trend of people leaving the cities is of great 
importance to this research.  It shows that before World War II, people were already exiting the 
urban centers and relocating to suburbia.  But people were not the only suburbanizing. 
For quite some time in Americas history, the manufacturing and retail industries in 
major cities and towns prompted entire families to leave the farm and migrate to the city.  
Families who made such decisions were in search of a better life, and for many the city was the 
answer they had been looking for.  It is not surprising then to see large cities emerge in the US 
and around the world.  In fact cities such as Cleveland and  
Table 4: Density Functions for Manufacturing 
Cities  1920 1929 1939 1948 1954 1958 1963 
         
Baltimore y .70 .66 .49 .48 .42 .37 .35 
 D 9,478 7,547 4,416 6,815 5,515 4,665 4,059 
         
Denver y 1.07 .94 .92 .85 .64 .46 .36 
 D 3,215 2,506 1,710 3,938 2,658 1,754 1,434 
         
Milwaukee y .52 .44 .40 .48 .40 .35 .29 
 D 11,713 8,921 5,012 12,996 8,594 7,048 5,189 
         
Philadelphia y .32 .35 .32 .33 .30 .29 .26 
 D 7,586 7,332 5,243 9,229 7,836 6,896 5,765 
         
Rochester y 1.51  1.28 1.32 1.41 1.34 1.27 .89 
 D 24,514 16,493 14,235 33,223 31,831 25,895 15,297 
         
Toledo y 1.55 1.24 1.16 .98 .93 .85 .70 
 D 17,097 13,214 6,570 10,638 8,414 6,223 5,517 
Source: Edwin Mills, Urban Density Functions, 1969 
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Pittsburgh staked their future on 
industry, investing copious 
amounts of capital into such 
projects.  As residents began to 
move away and relocate, so too 
did sources of employment in 
manufacturing and retail (see 
Tables 4 and 5).   Businesses left 
the central city for a variety of 
reasons, including changes in 
technology and a shift from 
reliance on the railroads to one 
on highway transport, and as far 
as retailing was concerned, a 
desire to get closer to the suburbanizing residential market.  This suburbanization reinforced the 
decline in central city land values This was hard for investors downtown to understand, because 
they were used to the central city being an attractive force and not a propulsion agent, 
encouraging people and business to locate there and not relocate to the suburbs.   
 The decline in population, manufacturing and retail in central cities were not isolated 
incidents, but rather reinforcing agents of decline.  Without jobs in manufacturing and retail, 
those who were able to move away did, and for obvious reasons.  And as the city was overrun by 
minority groups, investors downtown became anxious. Each successive movement of people 
flattened the densities experienced within and outside the city, acting as if to level the field as 
Edwin Mills predicted in his (1970) paper on urban density functions. .    
 
3.  The Central City Problem 
As people began leaving the cities for the suburbs, along with industry and business, 
property values in the central city plummeted.  Along with that, poorer people began settling 
downtown, further driving down the economic prospects of revitalizing the central city.  The 
central city problem was like a disease.  A community knew when they had caught the disease 
Table 5: Density Function for Retailing 
Cities  1929 1939 1948 1954 1958 1963 
        
Baltimore y 1.02 .88 .72 .60 .50 .40 
 D 7,257 6,592 7,029 5,086 4,073 2,587 
 
Denver y 1.10  1.00 .83 .76 .52 .39 
 D 3,933 3,697 3,876 2,617 2,094 1,366 
 
Milwaukee y .59 .56 .63 .53 .46 .30 
 D 4,039 4,074 6,951 4,666 3,857 1,877 
 
Philadelphia y .47 .39 .37 .44 .30 .26 
 D 4,493 3,118 4,182 5,797 2,855 2,229 
 
Rochester y 1.35 1.24 1.00 1.12 .90 .54 
 D 5,685 5,135 4,672 5,519 3,811 1,941 
 
Toledo y 1.61 1.30 1.03 1.03 .80 .56 
 D 6,501 4,486 4,325 3,894 2,396 1,482 
Source: Edwin Mills, Urban Density Functions, 1969 
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when the central city was predominantly inhabited by racial and ethnic minorities and composed 
of slum and blighted neighborhoods (Weiss 1980: 55). 
 According to Marc Weiss article entitled The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, 
there is a distinct difference between blighted and slum communities.  Weiss defines blighted 
communities as those characterized by declining property values (Weiss 1980: 55).  Such decline 
is in part driven by the perception that minority groups are a social problem. This perception can 
be contagious and affect other communities (Friedrichs 1993: 909).  As a result, these 
communities and neighborhoods received little if any economic investment.  Many individuals 
had given up and accepted their bleak reality; a misguided reality that isolated them from society 
and only diminished peoples ambition to succeed and improve their own lives.  This perpetuated 
a cycle of despair without hope. Slums, however, were similar to blighted communities, but the 
key difference was that land values were not plummeting; instead the social integrity of the 
community was unraveling.   
Slums and blighted communities alike, came into existence because others abandoned 
them; people with wealth in addition to industry and retail.  Although such communities had 
existed before people left for the suburbs, their presence grew in numbers because of an 
inadequate tax base.  Without financial assistance, cities slipped into disrepair, projecting an 
image of a dark and dangerous city, as compared to a peaceful and aesthetically pleasing 
suburban community. 
 There are many other schools of thought that try and explain the central city problem.  In 
his article A Theory of Urban Decline: Economy, Demography and Political Elites, Jurgen 
Friedrichs discusses how cities mimic products and the products associated life cycle, as it 
pertains to stages of growth and decline.  In the life cycle of a product there is the initial growth 
stage and then, as the product grows older and more people can afford it, it begins to stagnate 
until some new innovation either forces it to reinvigorate itself or simply disappear from the 
market (Friedrichs 1993: 908).  Cities are similar, in that from time to time they need to be 
examined and undergo revitalization projects in order to retain residents and attract financial 
investments.   Thus, the central city problem can also be thought about in terms of a stagnating 
city, which is in need of major repairs critical to its infrastructure and ability to function properly 
(Bradbury et al 1982: 19). 
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4.  Framing the Debate 
Fearful that they would loose a considerable amount of money on their investments, bankers, 
insurance companies and other clientele downtown, began forming coalitions to lobby local, 
state and federal officials for assistance.  These people were primarily concerned with the 
blighted communities and their proximity to the central business district, as opposed to the social 
ills occurring in the slums.  However, neither were attractive for investors and it was believed 
that such communities had to be demolished and redeveloped on a large scale. 
 To acquire such a copious amount of land for redevelopment required extensive financial 
resources, something the coalition did not have.  Additionally, the private sector had no legal 
means to go about forcibly purchasing and demolishing the property of others.  This is the why 
the private sector sought the assistance of public officials at all levels of government, for they 
had the financial capabilities and legal authority to stop the decline of inner cities and restore 
their pre-eminence.  The private sector believed that the central business district should maintain 
its integrity by exploiting land for profitable commercial use and high income residential 
development (Weiss 1980: 55).  This approach to urban renewal was much different from that 
of the public housers. 
 According to Weiss, public housers were concerned with the terrible conditions people 
had to live in and raise a family.  For these activists, inner city living conditions were deplorable.  
The only way to change conditions on the ground was to demolish blighted and slum 
communities and rebuild more affordable housing, with assistance from Federal and State 
agencies.  Unlike private sector investors, housers were out to restore communities and rebuild 
the city, uplifting people in poor communities.  Although each campaign defined urban renewal 
differently, they both were in agreement that slums and blighted neighborhoods had to be 
removed.  Both were hopeful that federal legislation would solve the central city problem and so 
the housers partnered with the business community to push through urban renewal programs. 
 
5.  Confronting the Central City Problem 
   The Housing Act of 1949 was the first attempt by the federal government in addressing 
the central city issue.  This legislation passed through Congress was the result of housers and 
business interests downtown, collaborating with one another.  Initially, the act looked promising 
for the housers, as communities were to be demolished and resettled in newly constructed 
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communities, paid for by the public. But with persistence and intense lobbying efforts led by the 
downtown business coalition, over the years the legislation was transformed.  Through several 
amendments, the housing provisions of the original legislation making affordable housing 
available to low-income people, were diluted.  Although regulations had been diluted, there were 
still provisions within the amendments, requiring that in every urban renewal project, some sort 
of affordable housing be incorporated into the overall design (Library of Congress 1973: 42).  
While the housers had won the battle initially in getting these regulations into the legislation, the 
special interests downtown won the war. 
 For businesses downtown, slum clearance meant the elimination of poor housing, without 
being obligated to reconstruct new homes or be responsible for the livelihoods of poor people in 
general.  What became of former residents did not bear any importance to business leaders, 
except that they were determined to make sure they did not relocate somewhere else in the 
central business district (Weiss 1980: 64). 
 In addition to urban renewal programs, business interests also lobbied the government 
over the detailed routing of its proposed interstate highway system, connecting the countrys 
largest metropolitan areas to one another. Although such highways were meant to improve 
commerce between cities and allow military assets to be easily transported, downtown business 
interests also saw them as serving another purpose.  The proposed highway system was meant to 
do two things for business downtown; the first was to improve the central business districts 
accessibility to the rest of the city and suburbia.  It was thought that these highways would attract 
more business downtown, bringing investment and more importantly revenue back into the city.  
The highways were also a way to destroy blighted communities in the central city, by using the 
power of eminent domain to demolish communities and so to reclaim land for new development.   
Driving on the highway in any inner city, one will notice how close the housing stock is located 
next to the highway, particularly in older cities.  This is due to cheap land being bought up and 
the highways being placed where homes once use to stand.  For the investors downtown, 
highways were considered a major factor in charting future development in the metropolitan 
area, by eliminating poor communities and raising the property values in the central business 
district (Library of Congress 1973: 183).   
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6.  Overview 
 The decline of the industrial city in the 20th century was due to a number of factors, the 
first of which was improved personal and economic mobility.  As income rose in many 
American households, people began to question the practicality of living in such a congested and 
polluted environment.   With the assistance of technological innovations in transportation, the 
automobile served as a way out of the city and in fact fostered suburbanization.  Deteriorating 
conditions in the city, encouraging people who could afford to leave to get out, fueled 
suburbanization.  Migration out of the city also caused employers and retailers to rethink their 
business strategy downtown, resulting in business and industry relocation beyond the citys 
limits. Such a harsh reality is accounted for in the tables provided by Edwin Mills. 
 This exodus from the city not only left local government without a sufficient tax base, but 
it also caused property values to plummet.  Like a vacuum, as the wealthy families moved away, 
poor families moved in behind them, establishing what Marc Weiss defined as slums and 
blighted communities. Such communities reinforced this migration of retail, industry and 
population out of the city.  While parties agreed that something had to be done to resolve the 
central city problem, each saw the future of the city differently. 
 For the housers, the current housing stock people resided in was beyond repair, and thus 
many needed a fresh start.  They believed that building new neighborhoods and communities for 
the poor would address their concerns, as well as help curtail the decline in property values that 
investors downtown were concerned about.  Although investors believed that such communities 
should be demolished as well, they did not believe it was the publics responsibility to provide 
these people with adequate housing.  They were more concerned with charting a new direction 
for the city and laying the foundation for creating what came to be referred to as the post-
industrial city. 
 Initially, both parties believed urban renewal was the key to resolving the issue of 
blighted communities and the central city problem.  Together they lobbied local, state and federal 
officials, until legislation was passed in the congress in 1949.  The Housing Act of 1949 
addressed both parties concerns, but through political maneuvering, public housing became less 
of a priority and then was eventually left out of subsequent pieces of legislation.  At the end of 
the day, private investors emerged victorious and with a vision of the post-industrial city; a 
vision that would increase property values downtown at the expense of the poor. 
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Conflict and Creating the Post-Industrial City 
 Until now, this thesis has outlined what the post-industrial city is and how it came into 
being.  But, little has been discussed about the conflict surrounding the development of the post-
industrial city.   Conflict is a fundamental part in creating such a city because of its associated 
costs to society and other special interests.  Thus the remainder of this thesis will examine the 
role of conflict in its creation and will discuss why different constituents oppose or support 
attempts by their respective cities to achieve major league status. 
 Funding issues are by far the most contentious in developing the post-industrial city.  In 
order to raise property values downtown and attract new businesses, cities must invest heavily in 
capital improvement projects.  These capital improvement projects often require stadia, 
convention centers, shopping and entertainment complexes to be built downtown.  Due the 
compact nature of the central city, old neighborhoods and structures must be either refurbished 
or demolished in order to accommodate these new projects.  The Circle Center Mall in 
downtown Indianapolis was built by refurbishing existing structures at a cost of $300 million 
dollars.  Although this mall downtown was delayed because of lawsuits and battles with property 
owners for 15 years, it is now the centerpiece of the citys revitalization efforts (The Indianapolis 
Star: September 7, 1995).  
 Other sources of tension in creating the post-industrial city concern the assembly of land 
parcels and the impact new projects, such as sports stadia, have on surrounding neighborhoods.  
Local government officials and leaders are usually at the center of these controversies because of 
their ability to exercise powers of eminent domain (the power to enforce the sale of land for the 
public good, but with monetary compensation). This right and authority vested to local 
government can be contentious because of the impact land acquisition has on a community.  In 
the case of freeway construction, entire communities have been either destroyed or separated.  
New sports facilities or entertainment districts can also have an impact on communities quality 
of life, by creating more congestion and noise for local residents. 
 Finally, a citys geographic location also plays a role in its attempt to become a 
major league city.  A city which desires to attract an airline hub, major league franchise or 
other notable improvement projects and investments, should expect to face opposition and even 
competition from other cities, especially if they are in close proximity to one another.   Such 
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opposition can inhibit a citys ability to attract such investments by denying it the necessary 
ingredients for development, thus making a citys location a potential source of tension. 
 Although the post-industrial city is a complex vision and roadmap for raising property 
values and increasing investments downtown, it is in some ways a new business model and 
source of conflict.  As Robert Atkinson explains in his book The Past and Future of Americas 
Economy, new technologies and business models are sources of change and conflict, because 
society is naturally resistant to change. While this is a relatively simple explanation for why there 
is resistance, it should come as no surprise.   In many issues relating to revitalization projects 
downtown, business leaders and public officials usually act in concert with one another to get 
major capital improvement projects completed.  They either try to persuade the local population 
to finance these large capital improvements or as was the case in Columbus, Ohio, build it 
themselves using all the financial and legal means available to them.  In the case of Columbus, 
this coalition between business and city officials was quite strong.  Equally strong and resilient, 
however, was the opposition to this groups effort to build a convention center and new stadium 
downtown, using nothing but tax revenue. 
The remainder of this thesis will examine conflict in the post-industrial city, as observed 
in Columbus, Ohio.  The citys effort to assert itself as a major league city has been quite 
contentious.  Columbus is particularly interesting city given its industrial heritage or lack thereof 
and its proximity to other major population centers like Cleveland and Cincinnati.  Thus 
Columbus will serve as a case study and testament to the conflict associated with the post-
industrial city. 
 
Conflict Around Constructing the Post-Industrial City: Columbus, Ohio 
 The literature on the post-industrial city has contributed enormously to our understanding 
of cities and their function in society.  In order to examine the conflict surrounding the post-
industrial city, Columbus, Ohio was chosen as a case study.  Columbus is a particularly good 
case study due to its geographic location, historical development and evolution as a state capital.  
For this study three capital improvement projects were examined; Nationwide Arena, the New 
World Center, and the Port Columbus International Airport.  While conflict is certainly present 
in all three studies, the nature of the conflict, the way in which it was framed and the parties 
involved varied.  Each study provides a brief history of the project and articulates the conflict of 
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interest.  In the process, differences of opinion are outlined and discussed.  The studies 
concluded with final thoughts regarding each project.  The order in which these studies have 
been arranged are as follows: New World Center, Nationwide Arena and Port Columbus 
International Airport. 
 
Case Study #1: The New World Center 
One of the most important capital improvement projects a city can invest in is a state of 
the art convention center.   These facilities, by their very nature, attract large organizational 
meetings, exhibitions and other events that require large meeting rooms and space where people 
can interact.  While convention centers are needed in order to facilitate this spatial interaction 
between people, they also have the capacity to generate a substantial and reliable source of 
revenue for the city and local businesses, particularly hotels and other elements of the hospitality 
industry.  Cities with convention centers tend to attract more business and have a significant 
advantage over other communities which do not have such a facility.  Thus a convention center 
should be considered a necessary component in creating the post-industrial city.  
 Beginning in 1984, Columbus sought to build a new convention center to replace the old 
Ohio Center, a convention center with 90,000 square feet of exhibition space.  For a city of its 
size and potential, city officials felt the Ohio Center was too small in terms of square footage and 
thus they wanted a new facility to sustain the economic growth and prosperity Columbus was 
then experiencing.  Support for this project was particularly strong among local businesses and 
governing bodies, including Limited Brands, the Ohio General Assembly and the Franklin 
County Commissioners.  This overwhelming support was not, however, shared by residents of 
nearby Italian Village or activist groups such as Citizens for Private Development, because of the 
traffic issues a new facility posed and the lack of financial support from downtown businesses, 
respectively. Opposition from these particular groups helped influence the greater Columbus 
community to reject initial attempts to construct the facility.  The residents of Franklin County 
rejected tax increases without significant private investments.  In rejecting this new facility 
twice, residents were not protesting the merits of a new convention center, but protesting the 
initial proposal for financing it.   
 In this case study, the idea of a new convention center was never an issue.   At issue was 
the lack of corporate investments. Columbus struggle to get this facility built is a testament to 
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the conflict surrounding the redevelopment of city centers.  At the same time it is an affirmation 
that Columbus was indeed taking steps to become a post-industrial city.    
 
An Ambitious Idea: With plans for nearly 400,000 square feet of exhibition space and 
provision for 65,000 seats, the New World Center was to be a multi-purpose facility that would 
accommodate not only large conventions, but support a professional sports team, though with the 
exception of baseball.  The sections to follow discuss the citys ambitions to build such a facility.  
While the New World Center was never built, from that idea developed the convention center in 
1993 and Nationwide Arena in 2000, home to the National Hockey Leagues Columbus Blue 
Jackets. 
 Before plans for the New World Center became public, Columbus hired a consultant for 
building arenas and convention centers, Neil Gunn.  In his analysis, he cautioned Columbus to, 
first, understand the convention business market and secondly, to look for public subsidies 
(Columbus Dispatch: June 13, 2006).   Columbus first attempt of getting public support to build 
a new convention center, failed (Columbus Dispatch: September, 1984), despite lobbying efforts 
made by former Senator John Glenn.   Voters in Franklin County refused to support an initiative 
that raised the county-wide tax by a half of a percent.  This did not, however, stop city and 
business officials from pursuing other means. Rather the Columbus Chamber of Commerce 
created a task force to look at the convention center issue.   
 This task force was led by Coopers and Lybrand and outlined ten different possibilities 
for funding the new convention center (Columbus Dispatch: January 1985).  Of these, a plan to 
tax restaurants, taverns, hotels and admissions to events was perceived as the most viable option 
for the city.  The proposal called for a 3 percent tax on restaurants, 2 percent hotel bed tax and a 
2 percent city tax on admissions.  This was not received well by local businesses. Their support 
was important if the issue were to pass a vote in the Ohio Senate.  Due to laws governing the 
increment by which taxes can be raised, changes in the law were necessary in order for the 
proposal to proceed.  The Ohio Association of Bear and Wine Wholesalers, was particularly 
vocal because the organization did not believe the tax was fair (Columbus Dispatch: January 
1985).  When this issue came before the Ohio Senate in 1985, after a close vote, the tax proposal 
failed.  This vote in the Senate was greatly influenced by intense lobbying efforts made by the 
Ohio State Restaurant Association and Ohio Council of Retail Merchants (Columbus Dispatch: 
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January 1895).  Although this new facility would have brought business downtown, the tax 
would have been applied to the entire county, causing these special interest groups to voice their 
concerns.  But despite this vote, city officials pressed on. 
 A few months later, after much discussion and deliberation, the Franklin County 
Commissioners put a tax initiative on the ballot for May of 1985 (Columbus Dispatch: March 
1985).  As a proponent, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce organized a campaign to support 
the ballot initiative.  The goal of this campaign was simple; garner enough support for a 0.5 
percent tax increase over 10 years and Columbus will get a new convention center.  But 
according to a report in the Columbus Dispatch on March 9, 1986, support for this was 
lukewarm.  In response, the campaign changed its tactics.  Instead of trying to appeal to middle-
aged conservative voters, the campaign sought to attract young people to polls in order to pass 
the ballot initiative (Columbus Dispatch: April 1986).  To assist in their efforts, community 
leaders like Lex Wexner, owner of Limited Brands, were brought in (Columbus Dispatch: April 
1986).  The Short North community, along with 10 suburban businesses voiced their support for 
the tax increase.  The Short North was particularly interested in the New World Center because 
of its close proximity and location just to the north along High Street.  But despite all these 
public endorsements, residents in Franklin County were not satisfied. 
 Those railing against such a project included the Italian Village Society and Citizens for 
Private Development.  Italian Village did not endorse the New World Center because blueprints 
never called for a meaningful parking resolution.  Residents in Italian Village believed that if a 
new facility was to be built next door, it would have a detrimental impact on parking in their 
neighborhood  a neighborhood with limited off-street parking - and therefore on their overall 
quality of life (Columbus Dispatch: April 1986). Although the city offered to institute a parking 
program for the village, the residents did not find that to be an adequate response.   
 The other major voice in opposition to this issue was Citizens for Private Development.  
This group of individuals believed that large, costly projects should be partially, if not totally 
financed by the private sector.  Why?  As Edward Raiser, a resident of Reynoldsburg wrote in 
the Columbus Dispatch, Why tax so many, so long, when so few will actually benefit from the 
construction of the New World Center (Columbus Dispatch: April 1986).  Apparently many 
agreed with Mr. Raiser, because on May 6, 1986, Issue 1, a ballot initiative to raise the sales tax 
0.5 percent failed by a 46 to 56 percent margin (Columbus Dispatch: May 1986). 
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Analysis and Conclusion: The New World Center was a bold and ambitious plan to 
redevelop downtown Columbus.  For Columbus size, this 90,000 square foot Ohio Center had 
served the community well, but did not meet the citys potential.  Before the Greater Columbus 
Convention Center was built in 1993, Columbus was only able to compete for 30 percent of the 
total convention business market.  Such an inadequate facility was therefore seen as no longer 
acceptable.  City and business officials agreed that Columbus needed a new Convention Center, 
but at issue were the facilitys new size and the mechanisms by which it was going to be 
financed. 
 Both public and private interests were frustrated with the financial component of the New 
World Center proposal.  At first the plans called for increasing taxes on particular local 
businesses rather than public funds to pay for it.  To support the facility, a tax on restaurants, 
liquor and hotels was discussed.  This was quickly rejected by local business interests.  This lack 
of support set the project back.  Instead of bypassing the public with private funding, the city had 
to confront the voters. 
 While Mayor Rinehart believed that a convention center should be financed and so 
owned by the public, others did not feel the same way.  Some within his party, who were on the 
Board of County Commissioners, expressed their concern about this issue of seeking support 
from the public.  But despite their concerns, Issue 1 made it onto the ballot.  Issue 1 was 
particularly interesting because it not only sought money for the New World Center, but for 
COTA (the Central Ohio Transit Authority).  Knowing that this new proposed sales tax would 
generate more than enough revenue for the New World Center, officials wanted to appear 
fiscally responsible.  So, they added COTA into the ballot initiative.  Whatever money the new 
facility did not need, it would go to COTA.  This, however, proved to be a strategic error, for at 
the time, COTA had a surplus in operating funds.  Although the language of the bill was well 
crafted, voters did not support the issue.   
 Residents of Franklin County did not support the issue because the facility was too 
ambitious and was to cost the private sector nothing.  As the group Citizens for Private 
Development pointed out, the facility was too big.  David Sheir and his organization agreed that 
if a smaller facility was proposed and if a significant portion of the project was funded by private 
investors, they would then support a new convention center downtown (Columbus Dispatch: 
May 1986).  The only caveat was that a new tax increase not be reintroduced to the public. 
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The New World Center, as contentious as it was, sparked an interest in many people living in 
Franklin County.  As one college student pointed out in an editorial written in the Lantern, 
Columbus was a diamond in the rough (The Lantern: January 24, 1985).  The New World 
Center was Columbus first attempt at changing that image.  In design, the New World Center 
was a state of the art, multi-purpose facility.  Such a project, if it had been completed would have 
made Columbus a viable competitor in attracting the largest conventions in the nation.  Using the 
latest in technology, the New World Center was designed so that it could be transformed into a 
65,000 seat arena.  And even though the city did not have a major league team, such a facility 
would have been useful in attracting a major franchise to Columbus.  This ambitious new 
facility, however, never materialized.  This was due to several flaws in the design and in the way 
proponents of the facility marketed the New World Center to voters. 
First, the New World Center was simply too big for residents to comprehend.  Evidence 
of this is found in David Sheirs remarks in the Columbus Dispatch.  In that particular article 
Sheir voiced support for a smaller facility, that was not so overwhelming, but still allowed 
Columbus to be competitive in the convention business (Columbus Dispatch: May 1986).  The 
other reason voters did not support the New World Center was because of the citys hasty 
campaign. According to the research, the citys attempt to market the convention center to 
younger voters was another strategic error.  While young people would be more likely to take 
advantage of concerts and different events in the building, this cohort had a history of not voting 
at the polls.  Students like R. Scott Sprigs, believed Columbus was a diamond in the rough.   
And if improvements were not made to the citys quality of life, students like Sprigs were ready 
to leave after graduation.   In trying to solicit support from Sprigs and other in his cohort, the 
campaign effectively isolated Middle America, a cohort that is statistically more involved in the 
democratic process.  This group of individuals, along with many others, felt as if they did not 
have a voice in the matter.  According to William Habig, Director for the Mid Ohio Regional 
Planning Commission, people wanted to be listened to and have a voice in the issue.  
Unfortunately voters were not given this opportunity, and expressed their frustrations at the 
polls.  And although the New World Center was never built, the facility, in a sense, ultimately 
gave birth to several projects which essentially achieved its original objectives.  These projects 
included the Greater Columbus Convention Center and Nationwide Arena.  Nationwide and the 
Convention Center met the demands of local businesses and upheld the ideals of the New World 
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Center, at no cost to the general public.  Although this is just an observation, it was better that 
residents resisted being coerced into supporting the New World Center.  In the end two new 
facilities were built (primarily funded by the private sector), each being very successful in 
generating new business and improved the metro areas quality of life.  
 
Case Study #2: Nationwide Arena 
The development of Nationwide Arena and the subsequent businesses and housing that 
surround the complex downtown, was a major redevelopment project that took over a decade to 
realize.  Known as the Arena District today, Columbus now boasts a lively entertainment district, 
where opportunities for growth are self-evident.  This has undoubtedly elevated Columbus 
stature as a post-industrial city, by allowing it to join a growing number of cities that already 
have such facilities.  But this was not always the case. 
Until Nationwide Insurance publicly announced its partnership with the Columbus 
Dispatch to privately fund an arena downtown, the prospects for such a venue were grim.  The 
City of Columbus had tried, on five different occasions, to fund an arena/sport complex 
downtown on the site of the former Ohio State Penitentiary.  The citys first attempt at getting 
the voters of Franklin County to support the arena and publicly finance it, failed in 1986 
(Columbus Dispatch: April 1988).  Although this had to be discouraging, the city and its 
business coalition were relentless.  They believed that such a venue downtown would make 
Columbus a more attractive location for business and ultimately raise property values in the inner 
city.   Proponents of the arena were determined to build such a facility in Columbus, and in 2000 
Nationwide Arena opened its doors to the public.  However, the time and money poured into 
getting this venue in Columbus is questionable.  If the business community was able to finance 
such a robust project, why did it wait nearly 10 years to build the facility?  Additionally, what 
role did the city play in garnering support for building the arena downtown, especially when a 
similar facility was already being constructed on the campus of Ohio State?  The answer is 
relatively simple: proponents wanted taxpayers to finance the arena.  Only after various 
proposals and methods promoting the arena had failed, did the coalition seek an alternative to 
publicly funding the arena. 
This case study will examine the history and development of Nationwide Arena.  
Looking at the arena downtown as a story told through a file of old newspaper stories, from 
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beginning to end, reveals the inherent conflict around developing this facility.  While the city and 
its business partners were forthcoming in telling the people the benefits an arena would bring to 
Columbus and Central Ohio, they were not so forthright in explaining their reasons for building 
the arena with public money.  At the center of this conflict were different coalitions and interests, 
all having a stake in the outcome of an arena being built in downtown Columbus.  While the 
facility was eventually built, the scope, size and primary financier of the project changed with 
time.  This case study examines how special interests and opposing points of view can hinder the 
development of the post-industrial city.  
 
Stadia and Downtown Redevelopment:  One strategy to bring people back downtown and attract 
private investment is to construct sport stadiums or arenas.  These facilities usually house a 
major league team, in addition to concerts and other events.  They also spur other development 
projects, as indeed was the case in Columbus with the Arena District.  Until Nationwide Arena 
was completed in 2000, the city of Columbus did not have these types of facilities.  Although 
Ohio State had St. Johns Arena, its capacity was also limited.  Without an arena, Columbus 
could not entertain large concerts.  Revenue generated from these events was lost to Cincinnati 
and Cleveland, which had large stadiums and arenas of their own.  Thus there was a common 
interest between city and business leaders to ensure that Columbus would also have an arena 
downtown, in the foreseeable future. 
 
The Literature:  Conversations about the arena downtown began in 1967 during Mayor 
Sensenbrenners administration.  Mayor Sensenbrenner appointed a Sports Committee to 
examine an arenas feasibility in downtown Columbus.  Nothing came about after the committee 
met, but it did signal that the city was interested in building such a facility.  The issue came to a 
head in 1986, when voters in Franklin Country were asked to fund an arena through revenue 
generated from an increase in taxes.  In 1986 and again in 1987, the voters rejected the proposal 
outlined by the city and business community.  Discouraged, Mayor Reinhart nevertheless 
believed that the voters could be swayed if they were given the proper tax mechanism 
(Columbus Dispatch: August 1988).  Ultimately, the Mayor would be proven wrong, but not 
without subsequent attempts there after.   
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In order to understand the arena project and plans for its development, one must understand the 
alliance between the city and businesses downtown.  Each member of this coalition stood to gain 
considerably in terms of revenue, increased property values, and opportunities for economic 
growth that it was thought an arena downtown would bring. There was, however, some 
uncertainty about what the payoff would be. Knowing this, they wanted to minimize the financial 
risk of such a project to themselves.  The way to negate this, in their view, was to shift the 
burden from the private sector to the public sector.  This had been the case in most cities around 
the country, where the public funded sporting complexes.  As it turned out, the city was not able 
to garner enough support for this project, but the arena got built anyway. This was not before a 
highly contentious campaign in which the Ohio State University was implicated in virtue of its 
own arena plans. 
 Having been defeated twice before, the city and its allies realized that it needed a sound 
proposal in order to garner enough support in Franklin County.  After several studies had been 
conducted by Columbus Downtown Inc. (CDI), a site for the arena was selected.   The arena was 
to be built on the site of the Ohio State Penitentiary.  Its proximity to the central business district 
and the citys new convention center made this a particularly attractive location.  The group also 
calculated that an arena could be built by imposing a .25 percent increase in sales tax on voters in 
Franklin County, as well as other taxes levied on liquor and cigarettes (Business First of Greater 
Columbus: January 1990).   
 Once the city intentions became public, action groups were formed in order to derail the 
project.  Groups like Citizens for Private Development accused the city of asking the voters to 
pay for an arena that would bring large profits to its business partners and not the people of 
Franklin County.  The organizations leader, Richard Sheir, blasted the CDI for the research it 
conducted, asking, Why doesnt the business community get behind this project with actual 
bona fide dollars? (Columbus Dispatch: January 1990).  While Sheir never denied that an arena 
downtown would be a nice amenity to the city, he and his followers believed it was not just to 
ask the public to pay the bill.  Others who did not agree with the way the city wanted to fund the 
arena, demonized the proposed increase in liquor and cigarette taxes, calling them sin tax(es) 
(Columbus Dispatch: April 1990).  Even so, the city pressed on and purchased the site of the old 
Ohio State Penitentiary for $4.5 million.  But the city still needed a reason for the public to feel 
personally invested in an arena downtown.  The solution: Promote the arena as a strategic asset 
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for attracting a major league team to Columbus.  Its first port of call, however, was The Ohio 
State University. 
 In discussions going back to 1989, the University made it clear that it was interested in 
building a new arena for its growing athletic program.  It also made it clear that if such a facility 
were ever built, it would be built on the campus of Ohio State and serve the student body 
(Columbus Dispatch: April 1989).  This adversely impacted the citys ability to promote an 
arena. This was because it needed a large tenant to occupy a new arena. While it hoped to attract 
a major league franchise, there was concern that this might take time, and meanwhile bond 
payments would have to be met on the new arena. Having the university basketball team as a 
major tenant would therefore reduce the financial risks. As a result, the city asked the University 
to consider having its mens basketball team play its home games in the arena downtown.  Such 
an agreement would have brought in a reliable source of revenue for the arena and made Ohio 
State partners in the project.  But this never came to fruition. Instead, Ohio State went on with its 
own plan to build a 60-80 million dollar arena at the intersections of Olentangy River Road and 
Lane Avenue some two to three miles away from the site planned for the arena downtown. 
Furthermore, and to begin planning such a massive project, the University lobbied the State of 
Ohio for 10-15 million dollars.   This angered the city and prompted Mayor Lashutka to send 
President Gordon Gee a letter, expressing his dissatisfaction and assuring the University it would 
have no support from the city (Columbus Dispatch: March 1994).  There was more to this than a 
simple question of location, however.  
 During the mid 1990s, the State of Ohio was facing budgetary deficits.  Money was scare 
and spending was limited (Interview: Dr. Herbert Asher April 11, 2006).  While the city had 
already, for the most part, decided on a site for their arena, the planning stages had not yet been 
implemented.  Mayor Lashutkas letter to President Gordon Gee was a way for him to express 
his displeasure that Ohio State and the City were now competing for the same operational funds 
from the State Capital Budget.  While the City had only requested 1 million dollars, on May 19, 
1994, Speaker of the House Vern Rife Jr. confirmed that the University had been fully 
appropriated the money it had requested  15 million dollars - while the city had not1.   
                                                
1 Ohio States lobbying effort had been coordinated by Dr. Herbert Asher, who was the chief Ohio State Lobbyist 
and council to President Gordon Gee[0]. 
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Nevertheless, and even though Ohio State had been appropriated the funds necessary to plan 
their arena, legislators at the State House demanded that the University work in concert with the 
city to come up with an agreement about how such a facility would be managed (Columbus 
Dispatch: June 1994).  The city, at first, liked this idea and demanded a significant voice in the 
operation of the arena.  But at the same time it wanted to build its own arena downtown.  At 
issue in these discussions was the sale of skyboxes.  The sale of skyboxes was seen as a very 
important way for the arena to generate revenue and gain sponsors.  But if major corporations 
with money to pay for skyboxes were to see Ohio Sate with such facilities, then promoting an 
arena downtown would be that much more difficult. 
 To promote its project, the city formulated a campaign called Citizens for Downtowns 
Future.  But despite their fundraising and corporate sponsorships, the campaign failed, with 
nearly 30,000 more people voting against the proposed .25 percent increase in sales tax.  While 
the tax would have only been in place for only 3 years, people were still skeptical and 
overwhelmingly voted the issue down (Columbus Dispatch: June 1994).  On a positive note, 
however, in October the city and the University reached an agreement, outlining the terms and 
conditions for the new Ohio State arena.  Significantly, the University agreed not to build 
skyboxes and use the venue for athletic programs only, allowing the City to pursue its own arena 
(Columbus Dispatch: September 1994) through yet another campaign for public financial 
support.  Despite continuous setbacks, the city and its allies were persistent in their cause; but so 
too were those opposed to the arena being built with tax dollars. 
 Coming to grips with reality, those wanting a stadium downtown started to change their 
strategy.  At first advocates for the arena claimed that a facility of that magnitude would generate 
jobs and make Columbus competitive in attracting new business to the city and to Central Ohio 
(Columbus Dispatch: October 1993).  The citys competitive edge, it was argued, depended upon 
Columbus ability to attract a major league franchise and have them settle in Columbus.  Not 
only would a major league team prove to be attractive for investors, but bolster the citys image 
as a top tier city.  Opponents of the arena and of the proposed increase in taxes believed that 
business and property owners downtown stood to benefit the most, and not the greater 
metropolitan area and so, by implication, they should be the ones to fund the project.  But despite 
the citys best efforts and a media blitz, the issue failed in 1994.  The voters did not consider the 
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arena to be a critical piece of infrastructure the city lacked, as, for example, did Ron Puzzuti, a 
private developer downtown (Columbus Dispatch: June 1994).  
 Over the next few years, the city widened its coalition, getting local communities on 
board, as well as the Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the Franklin County Convention 
Authority (FCCA).  The FCCA took the lead on yet another attempt to get the arena built, but the 
strategy had changed.  Instead of promoting the arena and a - by now - stadium complex as 
something the community should invest in, the campaign set out to show how financing such a 
facility was a low risk investment on the part of the people in Franklin County. 
 This part of the campaign really took off when Lamar Hunt, owner of the Kansas City 
Chiefs, founder of the American Football League (AFL), and owner of the Columbus Crew saw 
Columbus potential to become a major league city.  Hunt was interested in the project because 
he saw an opportunity to move his Major League Soccer franchise, the Crew, out of its 
temporary quarters at Ohio Stadium to a new stadium downtown that would be part of the larger 
stadium complex for which plans were then underway.  To make the arena project even more 
appealing, Hunt promised that his company would oversee operational expenses, guaranteeing 
the community that, for 25 years, it, and not the voters of Franklin County, would absorb 
potential losses.  On the other hand, as more groups such as Columbus City Council and the 
Congress for Black Development got on board in 1996 and 1997, those opposed to the tax rallied 
support from communities likely to be impacted by the arena downtown, such as Victorian 
Village, and from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  
But in response to this, the effort on behalf of the city and other business interests was 
considerable.  Among other things, they were able to get the President of Ohio State, Gordon 
Gee, to serve as co-chairman of the campaign. But their new strategy did not go unnoticed and 
faced stiff opposition. 
 Those who opposed to the arena previously remained the leaders in the effort to defeat 
the ballot initiative in 1997.  But despite the high level profiles of those speaking in favor of the 
arena, such as President Gee and Lamar Hunt, opponents were still able to rally support.  Among 
their supporters were Samuel Staley, President of The Buckeye Center for Public Policy 
Solutions.  In an article published in the Dispatch, Staley said that industrial and service sector 
investment would have a much larger return than a downtown arena could (Columbus Dispatch: 
January 1996).  These comments and other issues that were discussed concerning the citys 
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ability to attract a major league franchise to Columbus, help to garner support for the opposition.  
Soon social organizations like VAST (Voters Against Stadium Taxes) and Victorian Village 
community signed on in opposition to the proposed tax increases.  A poll taken by the Dispatch, 
a month before voters went to the polls, showed the arena loosing ground among voters.  And 
despite various promises made by prominent people throughout the campaign, the issue was 
defeated on May 7th, 1997.  With an unusually high turn out of nearly 39 percent of eligible 
voters, the issue was in fact soundly defeated with 56 percent of the voters saying No to a tax 
increase. 
 Discouraged and outraged, the city and business community resorted to what was 
evidently Plan B, though it had never been made public.  Plan B called upon private investment 
to fund an arena downtown.  Nationwide Mutual Insurance, headquartered in Columbus, along 
with the Dispatch agreed to fund the arena project.  With the cost of the project near 150 million 
dollars, Nationwide financed 90 percent of the project, while the Dispatch picked up the 
remaining 10 percent.  For their investment and partnership, Nationwide and the Dispatch have 
benefited greatly.  The arena, along with its surrounding businesses, has created a dynamic 
atmosphere in at least that part of Columbus, one that did not exist prior to the arenas 
construction.  And although the city and business community have also reaped the benefits of a 
downtown arena, particularly Nationwide, one might claim that the big winners were the citizens 
of Franklin County. The residents were winners because they got a stadium at virtually no cost to 
them as tax payers.  This was not the case in many cities around the country, where the public 
funded a majority of such projects. 
 
Analysis and Conclusion:  While the story of the arena, told in this review, is not a complete 
account of the entire conflict surrounding its construction, it does highlight key moments from 
the debate as it ensued from 1986 through 1997.  What particularly caught the attention of this 
researcher was the political maneuvering and rhetoric expressed by those who had an interest in 
the arenas construction.  Over the years, those for and against the arena downtown listened to 
what each other were saying, and adapted accordingly in order to make their case to the voters of 
Franklin County.  In the end, however, the arena was built by a special partnership between 
Nationwide Insurance and the Columbus Dispatch.  This indicates two things; first, the city and 
its business associates downtown were committed to building an arena downtown and secondly, 
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this alliance between public and private officials was resolute in improving Columbus stature as 
a post-industrial city, as long as they stood to gain something from it.   
 The citys attempt to get an arena downtown went through several evolutions, first being 
promoted as a crucial part of the citys infrastructure and engine for economic growth, and then 
as a low risk investment for voters who stood much more to gain than loose.  Over a period of 10 
years, the city and its coalition lobbied the State, struck deals with The Ohio State University that 
were never intended to be honored (Interview: Herbert Asher, March 11, 2006) and welcomed 
the assistance of big name sport owners to try and rally support.  Ohio States President, Gordon 
Gee, was not able to convince residents of Franklin County to support the city and its ambitions.  
In retrospect, this lack of support from the people was due to two things; first, the city did not 
have a bargaining tool with which to garner support.  Columbus status as a major league city 
was never at risk.  But this was not the case in Cincinnati or Cleveland, where major teams and 
their owners demanded state of the art facilities, like Jacobs Field, or the team would leave.  In 
Columbus city officials and businesses downtown did not have this weapon of losing something 
that was already there, along with its popular support base.  Second, it was never able to develop 
a strategy to change public opinion, because the situation in Columbus did not warrant that such 
a massive redevelopment project be financed by the voters.  From an economic standpoint, 
Columbus was, and remains, a prosperous city.  With investments in a new convention center 
and city center mall downtown, the urgency for an arena did not sit well with the people.  Instead 
they saw through the media campaigns and the Universitys support, as merely a ploy and not a 
legitimate endorsement.  Despite the high profile people and businesses who threw their hats into 
the ring in support of the arena, the coalition was forced to construct the arena with private 
funds. 
 Those opposed to building the arena with taxpayer dollars were successful because they 
pointed out the obvious.  This grass roots effort to oppose the arena was a success because it 
adapted to the different strategies proponents employed.   They saw the city and private sector 
benefiting tremendously from a sport complex downtown, at the expense of taxpayer money, and 
made their concerns known.  Indeed, for as much money the city and businesses invested over 
the years to build support for the arena downtown, they could have financed their own planning 
efforts for an arena, instead of asking the State, which later refused to endorse it.   
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From the start, the opposition had an advantage due to Columbus economic prosperity and the 
fact that they were gaining something whose benefits were notional rather than losing something, 
like a football franchise, as in the case of Cincinnati, whose benefits were already real for large 
numbers of people.  For these individuals, recognizing changes in strategy and formulating a 
response was key to keeping the public in their corner.  In an interview with Dr. Herb Asher on 
April 11, 2006, he called the voters of Franklin County smart.  The voters were smart 
because they did not allow the city to build an arena with a possible major league team coming to 
Columbus at their expense.  Instead what the voters got was Nationwide Arena, a National 
Hockey Team in the Columbus Blue Jackets and a new entertainment district, full of restaurants 
and retail establishments, at no cost to them. 
 And finally, the last point that must be emphasized here concerns special interest groups 
and their ability to threaten the development of the post-industrial city.  This statement alone 
bears discussion, because it implies that the post-industrial city is an attempt by city officials and 
big business to restructure the central city and allow it to once again become a center of 
commercial activity and development, as it once was during the Industrial Revolution.  This 
particular case involving the arena in Columbus is quite revealing, because it demonstrates 
special interests have an impact on the development of urban centers.   
 For the advocates who supported the arena downtown, the Ohio State University posed a 
threat due to the Universitys relationship with Central Ohio and more importantly, its own 
ambitions to build a new sporting venue on its campus.  Making the case for one arena was going 
to be hard enough, but justifying two facilities within two miles of each other was going to be an 
even great challenge.  Although the city and it allies downtown knew Ohio State would 
eventually build its own arena, they desperately sought to minimize its impact on their campaign.  
To do this they signed an agreement with Ohio State that made it clear, at least on the surface, 
that Ohio States new arena would be used for the sole purpose of athletic events and other 
University functions. This meant a new arena at the University would not include skyboxes; 
luxury seating that would be required in an arena if it was going to house more than just athletic 
events, like concerts.  Although this agreement was nothing more than a ploy, it was a way for 
the city and other interests downtown to control the noise surrounding Ohio States new arena 
(Interview: Herbert Asher, April 11, 2006).  This became apparent when Huntington Bank 
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announced it had sponsored a level of skyboxes for the new Value City arena (The Other: May 
15-21, 2006). 
 For what it is worth, the city exhausted every weapon at its disposal, in order to have the 
arena financed by tax dollars, instead of by private investments.  For the city, the arena was a 
must if it was to attract new businesses and improve the central business district.  For this 
reason, an alliance between the city and businesses downtown was to be expected.  But this 
coalition, in the end, underestimated the residents of Franklin County.  Dr. Asher was right; 
residents of Franklin County were appalled by the citys subsequent attempts to get the arena 
issue on the ballot (Interview: Herbert Asher April 11, 2006). After the arena issue had been 
defeated for a fifth time, and only after prospects of a National Hockey League in Columbus 
were in jeopardy, did the city and its business partners downtown decide to privately finance an 
arena.  The fact the city caved in after ten years makes this case particularly relevant when 
discussing the political nature and inherent conflict behind creating the post-industrial city. 
 
Case Study # 3: Port Columbus International Airport 
In order for the post industrial-city to take shape, significant investments must be made in 
a citys center.  This can take the form of redevelopment projects, such as building new arenas 
and convention centers.  But in order to be successful and ultimately improve a citys business 
prospects and vitality, the post-industrial city must be accessible to air transport services. 
 Regularly scheduled flights to and from different localities around the country, are 
important in todays economy.  While advances in telecommunications have significantly 
improved peoples ability to communicate and interact with one another, in many cases nothing 
can substitute for face to face interaction between people.2   
 A crucial background for the attempt of Columbus to improve its air passenger transport 
accessibility was the deregulation of civil aviation.  In 1978 the airline industry was deregulated, 
allowing airlines to set up their own business strategies with minimal government intrusion.  
These strategies often included implementation of a hub-spoke network.  The hub-spoke network 
                                                
2 Societys reliance on aircraft as a one of the most viable means of transportation was evident after September 11, 
2001.  When air traffic resumed three days after terrorists attacked New York City and Washington DC, Congress 
passed the Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act.  The bill provided the airline industry with temporary 
relief so as to offset the financial losses incurred after the attacks (Library of Congress: 1973).  This act by Congress 
demonstrated how vital air transportation is to the American economy, and how important access to well serviced 
airports are for business in the post-industrial city. 
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established several strategically located cities where airlines would base their operations, 
effectively bringing passengers from different cities to one place, where they could switch planes 
and reach their final destination.  This particular case study will examine the city of Columbus 
and its efforts to attract a hub to Port Columbus.  For public officials and the greater Columbus 
business community, getting a hub or at least more direct flights, was a major priority in the mid 
to late 1980s.  Although the city was never successful, conflict surrounding the development of 
Port Columbus warrants exploration and examination, because of its importance to developing 
and consolidating the post-industrial city in Columbus. 
Over the last two decades, Port Columbus has evolved from a small facility to an airport 
that has 160 flights land and depart daily, and where it is currently planning an ambitious project 
to construct another terminal by 2018.  Although it is highly unlikely Columbus will ever have 
the passenger traffic of Hartsfield in Atlanta, Georgia, Port Columbus is a necessary component 
in its development as a post-industrial city.   This section will review Columbus persistent 
attempts to attract a hub to the region and examine the political climate in which such issues 
have developed and evolved. 
 
Building a Hub: Columbus Failed Attempts:  After deregulation of civil aviation and the 
emergence of the hub-and-spoke strategy, having an airline hub in a particular city was seen as 
an asset for businesses in that community and an engine for future economic growth.  Columbus 
infatuation with establishing a hub at Port Columbus International Airport dates back to 1986.  
But in order to understand the urgency of creating such a facility in Columbus, there are several 
conditions that need to be taken into consideration. 
 
Columbus at a Disadvantage:  Before Columbus first attempt at establishing a hub, the city was 
already at a disadvantage.  Soon after deregulation occurred, cities entered into the market to 
ensure that their communities would be hubs in the airlines networks.  Such hubs and their 
support facilities had already been established in Cincinnati, Dayton, Indianapolis and 
Pittsburgh, thereby generating more passengers and business for respective airports and local 
economies. 
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Table 6: Statistics for Selected Airports in 1986 
Cities Passengers (millions) Gates 
Main Jet 
Runways 
Flights         
(Using 1985 
records) 
     
Atlanta 42.5 138 4 718,100 
Dallas-Fort 
Worth 37.1 101 6 561,600 
Pittsburgh 15.1 52 4 362,800 
Cleveland 6.4 42 4 154,600 
Cincinnati 4.5 38 2 147,900 
Dayton 3.7 26 3 167,200 
Indianapolis 3.8 27 2 70,100 
Columbus 3.2 18 1 75,400 
Nashville 1.4 22 2 123,100 
Source: Columbus Dispatch, 19 Nov. 1986 
 
Table 6 displays just how far Columbus lagged behind in 1985 in terms of its ability to receive 
and dispatch flights, as well as in terms of the number of passengers using the airport annually.  
This was of concern to those anxious to see Columbus attract corporate headquarters and other 
businesses relying on ease of access by air. As an article in the Columbus Dispatch on May 24, 
1987 stated, airline service is a major indication of a citys status and potential.  If Columbus was 
to become a major-league city, it needed to attract a hub and expand the airport at Port 
Columbus.  Not doing so would invariably make business interactions between Columbus 
companies and other parties, more expensive and time consuming. This was due to a lack of 
direct flights originating from and arriving in Columbus.   
This ultimately worked against what was considered by many to be a healthy market for 
business and airline service (Columbus Dispatch: May 24, 1992). In a report published by the 
Harris Organization, an affiliate with Cushman & Wakefield real-estate, the document 
recognized Columbus as a one of Americas premier cities to do business with, ranking it the top 
city in Ohio.  Although criteria for such comments were never outlined, the report also criticized 
Columbus for having a relatively small airport for its size and importance in Ohio (Columbus 
Dispatch: Harris Organization March 31, 1987).  Thus without having already established itself 
as a hub, Columbus was already at a disadvantage. In addition, we should note that passenger 
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traffic is a major form of income for airports. As a result airport officials also wanted to expand 
the airport.  Officials wanted to remain competitive with other cities.3   
Trying to attract a hub to the region was just one concern.  Getting people to switch 
airlines and embrace the new hub service was another.  In periodicals regarding this issue, while 
businesses wanted more access to direct flights, they were not willing to forego relationships 
already forged with other airlines.  This surprised the Columbus Chamber of Commerce which 
had advocated on behalf of America West airlines to establish a hub (Columbus Dispatch: 
September 1992). 
In addition to these various conditions, special interest groups, such as USAir, Columbus 
largest airline before America West, also played a significant role.  Although these conditions 
were not the reason Columbus failed to attract a major hub, it does highlight the difficulty 
proponents had in trying to establish one in the city. 
 
Columbus Attempt to Secure a Hub:  In the spring of 1986, the city of Columbus set out to 
expand the Port Columbus Airport.  The purpose of the $174 million dollar investment was to 
increase the number of gates at the airport, thereby increasing capacity for additional flights and 
paving the way, or so it was hoped, for an airline to establish a hub at Port Columbus.  The plan 
was to be financed by city bonds issued by Columbus, at least for the first year, and then rely on 
other contributors to finance the rest.  Such contributors included the Federal Aviation 
Administration, tenants in the airport and the Airport Authority. 
One of the proponents for this expansion was John Christie, President of Columbus 
Chamber of Commerce, attesting to strong business interest in the project.  Christie, like Mayor 
Rinehart, believed that Columbus future rested on its ability to remain competitive with other 
cities in terms of its accessibility to air transportation (Columbus Dispatch: September 1986).  
Over the next few months, different teams were assembled by the Mayors office in order to 
examine the projects feasibility.  Equally importantly, teams also met to develop a marketing 
strategy that would entice airlines to either establish a hub or secure more direct flights to and 
                                                
3 Although this report was published almost two decades ago, accessibility continues to be a problem for Columbus, 
according to David Whittaker, Vice-President of Business and Marketing for he Columbus Regional Airport 
Authority (Interview with David Whittaker: May 2006).  In terms of its ability to attract branch offices and other 
form of corporate employment, Columbus is seriously disadvantaged because of its lack of access. 
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from Port Columbus.  Their first attempt at securing an airline hub involved Trans World 
Airlines (TWA). 
In 1987, TWA representatives met with city officials to discuss the possibility of 
establishing what they called a mini-hub.  In order to accommodate this growing demand for 
new flights, TWA was looking at four possible sites.  They included Cleveland, Columbus, 
Philadelphia and a Southern city.  Although there was much speculation about whether TWA 
would set up a small operation in Columbus, possibly adding 80 flights a day, one thing was 
clear; TWAs selection would be strategic and in its best interests.  As the spokesman for TWA 
told the Dispatch in an interview, the city would have to have reasonably large traffic flows, 
large passenger yields and be strategically located (Columbus Dispatch: May 1987). To entice 
TWA to establish a hub operation in Columbus, the city offered the airline a $50 million dollar 
tax package.  Despite such an offer and amidst much speculation, however, TWA announced that 
it would not build another mini-hub and suspended all plans for such a facility indefinitely 
(Columbus Dispatch: April 1988).  While this was certainly a set back for the city and other 
officials who lobbied on behalf of it, the city still went on to expand the airport, and by so doing, 
it accommodated the needs of USAir, Northwest, American and Midway Airlines (Columbus 
Dispatch: April 1988). But there was still no hub. 
The next airline that talked about establishing a hub in Columbus was America West, and 
it actually went on to do so. America West was a relatively young airline that had formed after 
the airline industry was deregulated.   Based in Phoenix, it was known for its cheap fares and had 
existing hubs at Phoenix and Las Vegas.  To pull itself out from Chapter Eleven bankruptcy, the 
airline wanted to expand its services to the east coast of the United States. Part of its strategy was 
to establish a hub somewhere in the Midwest through which it could service the cities of the 
eastern seaboard.  Officials in Columbus seized the opportunity, with Bank One Corp, which had 
not coincidently expanded into Arizona, America Wests home state, taking the lead.  Bank One 
Corp, along with other investors tried to raise $100 million dollars for the embattled airline.  In 
return America West promised to bring low fares to Columbus, by making Port Columbus a hub 
for the east coast (Columbus Dispatch: April 1992).   
Over the next ten years, America West made a significant investment in the Port 
Columbus International Airport, establishing direct routes to major cities along the eastern 
seaboard, in Florida and in the southwest, though never expanding beyond mini-hub status. 
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Nevertheless, it brought increasing passenger traffic to Port Columbus.  Not only was domestic 
rider-ship up, Port Columbus was also expanding its sphere of influence into other markets, such 
as Dayton, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and northeastern West Virginia (Wilbur Smith Associates: 
January 2005).  This was partially due to the lower airfares and competition that the mini-hub 
provided as well as the closure of the USAir hub in Dayton.  At its peak operation in Columbus, 
America West was the largest carrier at Port Columbus and responsible for 49 flights leaving the 
airport daily (Columbus Dispatch: February 2003).  This, however, did not last. After September 
11, 2001, the company announced it would scale back to all but four of its flights from 
Columbus, citing significant losses in revenue (Columbus Dispatch: February 2003).  In Diagram 
1, the grey lines represent routes that were eliminated, while the bold black lines are routes 
America West still continues to operate as of 2003. 
                       
Although America Wests 
prominence at Port 
Columbus was relatively 
short, its impact on 
Columbus was significant.  
Because of America West, 
Columbus saw an increase 
in passengers using the 
airport and other airlines 
moved in to serve the 
routes abandoned by 
America West. More importantly, it elevated the image and status of the airport and the city as 
well. It is in this context that one can understand the Regional Airport Authoritys plan to make 
structural adjustments and expand Port Columbus by the year 2018. 
 
Prospects for Future Airport Expansion:  According to a study released by the Columbus 
Regional Airport Authority, Port Columbus will reach its maximum capacity of 10 million 
passengers a year by 2018 (Wilbur Smith Associates Inc. 2005).  This has prompted the Airport 
Diagram 1: America West Air Service to Columbus
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Authority to adopt a vigorous and multifaceted plan to accommodate this growth in the future, at 
a cost of $730 million dollars, none of which will come from residents of Franklin County. 
 This plan outlines a phased in project that will take more than a decade to complete.  The 
project calls for the reconstruction and reconfiguration of the International Gateway interchange 
and the construction of a new runway in order to accommodate a second terminal and garage.  
Construction of the first phase of the project will begin in 2007, with the International Gateway 
being reconfigured and constructed.  The extent, to which this plan materializes, however, 
depends upon passenger growth (Interview with David Whittaker: May 11, 2006).  By taking 
these steps now, and creating new capacity, Columbus is making itself more marketable in the 
future (The Lantern: November 1987). 
 
Conflict in Expansion:  Unlike other redevelopment or improvement projects, Port Columbus 
has evolved with little or no objection from the public.  There have been some instances where 
citizens near the airport have spoken up in opposition to such projects on amenity grounds, but 
for the most part, the public has not been a concern.  This is due to the nature of the way in 
which these projects have been funded; i.e., with little or no local tax dollars. 
 When Mayor Rinehart first supported the expansion of several new gates at Port 
Columbus in 1986, he made it clear that such projects should be funded by private developers 
and not the public.  Although the citys first attempt at getting TWA to establish a hub in 
Columbus failed, we have seen that the airport still expanded. This expansion was funded by 
local government bonds, the FAA, and revenue generated from tenants operating in the airport.  
There was, however, contention regarding the airports expansion and the citys 50 million dollar 
tax package in order to attract Trans World Airlines.  Although research has not confirmed 
airlines protesting such a proposal; it is safe to assume some airlines, particularly USAir, would 
have had issues with this special treatment and blatant favoritism. 
 Other comments expressing concern about Port Columbus expanding in the late 1980s 
centered on whether or not Columbus was even marketable to airlines.  As Director of Public 
Utilities and Aviation for the city of Columbus, Michael Long believed that Columbus was not 
strategically ready to market itself as a potential hub or mini-hub for a major airline (Columbus 
Dispatch: May 1986).  Being one of the fastest growing and prosperous cities in the Midwest at 
that time, it is difficult to assess the merit of this statement.  But in looking back at the extent to 
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which Columbus has evolved, Mr. Longs comments are well stated.  In 1986, the city of 
Columbus did not have a major convention center, City Center Mall or Nationwide Arena and 
Arena District.  In 1986, Columbus was still trying to find a way to gain an identity and bring 
business and people back downtown.  Mr. Long believed that without such investments 
downtown, economic                                           
growth would eventually 
stagnate and there would be no 
reason for airlines to invest in a 
city in decline.  Those cities 
that did have airline hubs also 
had convention centers, major 
league teams and the facilities 
to accommodate those teams 
and other events.  Therefore it 
is not surprising that Columbus 
never obtained a hub for its 
airport.  As Diagram 2 shows, 
Port Columbus surpassed both 
Cincinnati and Charlotte, two 
relatively large hubs for Delta and USAir respectively, in passenger traffic in 1992, but it does 
not provide any information regarding the number of people making connecting flights.  A hub is 
successful if a considerable number of people are brought in from other locations in order to 
change planes and reach their final destination.  Cities along the east coast, in addition to 
neighboring cities, such as Cincinnati and Pittsburgh, were already part of well established hub 
and spoke networks, thus never generating the number of daily passengers needed to sustain 
mini-hub operations at Port Columbus.  And is it not ironic that plans for Port Columbus 
expansion are now underway, only after significant investments have been made downtown?  
Although there is not a distinct correlation between redevelopment projects downtown and the 
capital improvement projects at Port Columbus, there is reason to suspect a cause and effect 
relationship. 
Diagram 2: Passenger Traffic at Three US Air Ports 
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The other major source of conflict in expanding Port Columbus over the years has resided in the 
private sector and with other special interests, which have had a stake in the airports growth.  
The most obvious is America West; a company which tried to emerge from bankruptcy by 
expanding its market to the east coast.  At the center of this plan was Columbus, a city that held 
much promise and was strategically located from America Wests standpoint.  Although 
operations in and out of Columbus were successful in lowering airfares at the airport, the hub-
and-spoke model was not.  America West and Port Columbus were not drawing enough business 
men and women from the east coast to change planes in Columbus to make hub  even mini- hub 
 operations at the airport profitable.  When domestic ridership was not able to offset this 
shortfall, the airline pulled out of Columbus.  In 2002 alone, America West had lost $25 million 
dollars from its operations in Columbus (Columbus Dispatch: February 2003).  Although 
attempts were made to help the unsettled airline in the beginning, Bank Ones campaign to raise 
$100 million dollars ultimately failed.  They failed because the local business community in 
Columbus was not ready to support and an airline in danger of going under, at the expense of 
relationships already forged with other airlines.  They were particularly uneasy about giving up 
their sky rewards programs; having accumulated countless points and benefits from flying with a 
certain airline.  But those who remained supportive of America West and its hub included tenants 
in the airport, local restaurants, hotels and other services that met the needs of air transportation. 
 
Analysis and Conclusion:   Although Michaels Longs comments regarding Columbus 
marketability were known, they were probably not taken as seriously as they should have been.  
Marketing in any business requires an individual to have a strategic plan for developing a 
particular idea, ensuring its success and then presenting that idea clearly and effectively.  In the 
case of Columbus, Mr. Long was right; Columbus was not ready to be marketed effectively, 
because it did not have the necessary infrastructure in place.  It was also surrounded by other 
communities that had been integrated into the hub-spoke model.  Columbus did not have an 
arena or large convention center.  In fact, the center of town was nearly empty after everyone left 
their offices downtown to go home in the evening.   
Its geographic location was also a hindrance, because it was in close proximity to other 
airports.  While still relatively large, Columbus catchment area in terms of passengers per day is 
limited and confined predominantly to southeast Ohio.  There were probably many instances 
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where different parties articulated their concerns for expanding the airport, but there were those 
who publicly and monetarily supported TWA and America West.  But the interesting source of 
conflict deals with the issue of whether a hub was ever viable for Columbus and whether or not 
the hub and spoke network is efficient today.  According to David Whittaker, the hub-spoke 
model is still an essential part of operations at larger airports.  But in the case of Columbus, non-
stop flights via direct routes are what the Columbus Regional Airport Authority is trying to 
attract (Interview David Whittaker, May 11, 2006).   If Columbus had had Nationwide Arena and 
the Greater Columbus Convention Center, along with other development projects, it might have 
been marketable in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.  But because the city did not have 
such things, and because it was considered to be a cowtown, the city was neither marketable 
nor efficient as a mini hub for America West. 
Today, there are significant plans to redesign Port Columbus to meet the needs of a 
growing metropolitan area.  Growth in Columbus is continuous because of the areas sprawling 
suburbs and continued investments in redeveloping downtown Columbus.  Plans to expand Port 
Columbus will make the city more accessible to businesses and investment and improve the 
citys marketability.  But despite the disappointments surrounding attempts to establish a hub, 
Port Columbus has continued to grow and is currently in the infancy stages of a 12 year 
expansion project. 
 
Final Thoughts and Conclusion 
 After reviewing the literature and completing the case studies, it is clear that the post-
industrial city is a carefully crafted and engineered vision of the future.  To assist in 
implementing this vision, the business community has relied heavily on the resources and 
authority of local, state and federal levels of government.  While some may contend that cities 
are changing their function in society, I would argue that they are simply being restored to the 
grandeur they once enjoyed. Although new arenas, convention centers, waterfront parks and 
gentrified communities were not present in cities a century ago, redevelopment projects such as 
these, are recapturing what the cities lost before suburbanization.  By cleaning up city streets, 
redeveloping blighted neighborhoods and investing in large projects, cities like Columbus, are 
breathing life back into the central city.  Their ally in redeveloping the urban center has primarily 
come from downtown and local businesses which stand to profit from investments like 
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Nationwide Arena. The business community has relied heavily on the financial resources and 
authority of local, state and federal government.  Investments like these and others examined in 
the case study, have inevitably raised property values and bolstered interest in downtown 
Columbus. While creating this atmosphere should be relatively simple given the legal and 
financial resources of this coalition, that could not be any further from the truth.   Projects 
involving money from the public have been quite contentious.  Residents in Columbus and 
Franklin County have consistently refused to support projects that do not have substantial private 
funding. This has made Columbus particularly interesting to study, because facilities like 
Nationwide Arena tend to be funded by the public elsewhere.  Nationwide, to my knowledge is 
one of the only privately financed facilities of its kind, in the country. 
  Studying the post-industrial city was a challenging and yet rewarding experience.  I was 
fortunate to have a good example of a post-industrial city in Columbus. Although conflicts 
surrounding projects over the last two decades have been relatively heated at times between the 
public, city and business officials, Columbus has emerged as a post-industrial city.  Today, the 
city of Columbus is much more attractive to investors and other businesses.  And with Port 
Columbus International Airport starting its initial phases of expansion, access to Columbus will 
only improve. 
 The post-industrial city is a function of an ever changing society.  Like change, there is 
always going to be some resistance.  But if a city is committed to restoring its prestige, that can 
be achieved.  One just needs to prepare for a bit of conflict along the way.  
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